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High at Age 65? 
Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
Age 65 is no longer the typical retirement age. Most employees now retire 
before 65, and those who are covered by defined-benefit pension plans often 
retire well before 65. Nonetheless, a large fraction of  persons who are still 
working at 64 retire at 65. For example, at one of the large Fortune 500 firms 
that are studied in this paper (Firm 3), 48% of men working at 64  retire at 65. 
In contrast, only 21% of men who work through age 63 retire at 64. Women at 
this firm show a similar increase in retirement rates, from 18% at age 64  to 
41% at age 65. Similar jumps in retirement rates at age 65 are found at other 
individual firms and more generally in nationwide measures of labor force par- 
ticipation. In each of the six data sets discussed in this paper, the highest retire- 
ment rate occurs at age 65. 
In a series of earlier papers, Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) and Lumsdaine, 
Stock, and Wise (1990, 1991, 1992, 1994) developed “option value” and sto- 
chastic dynamic programming models of retirement. These models have been 
estimated on several firm data sets. A striking feature of  the estimates is the 
extent to which they track actual retirement patterns that often exhibit sharp 
jumps in retirement rates at specific ages. Indeed, the models predict very well 
the retirement rates under special unanticipated “window” plans designed to 
encourage early retirement. Although in general these models fit most spikes 
in the data surprisingly  well, in particular at ages 55,60, and 62, they invariably 
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underpredict the age-65 retirement rates of  persons who do not retire before 
that age. In earlier papers we attributed the mismatch between predicted and 
actual rates to an “age-65 retirement effect,” having in mind the influence of 
custom or accepted practice. This paper considers other commonly proposed 
explanations for the underprediction of age-65 retirement. It is difficult to di- 
rectly demonstrate the influence of custom and the like. The spirit of the paper 
is to rule out other explanations and thus, by implication, to leave the age-65 
retirement effect as the remaining possibility. The results suggest that such an 
effect is the only plausible explanation that cannot be rejected. In particu- 
lar we conclude that the availability of  Medicare at 65 does not explain the 
age-65 retirement jump. 
The age-65 spike is in large part unexplained by  our economic models of 
retirement, and to our knowledge is rarely explained by  other models that do 
not  force, by  age-specific variables or by  other means, a “fit” to the age-65 
rate. Exceptions include Gustman and Steinmeier (1986, 1994) and Phelan and 
Rust (1993), as discussed below. There are a number of economic reasons why 
individuals might choose to retire at age 65. Social Security treats age 65 as 
the normal retirement age, and after age 65 the rate of increase in benefits is 
less than actuarially fair. Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) estimate that 90%  of firm 
pension plans also treat 65 as the normal retirement age, and under many 
defined-benefit plans there is a strong implicit financial penalty to working 
past the normal retirement age, as shown by  Kotlikoff and Wise (1988), for 
example. However, measured in terms of  expected lifetime benefits, the eco- 
nomic incentive to retire at 65, instead of 64  or 66, for example, is not large 
enough to explain the age-65 rate. In particular, although our economic models 
of retirement-which  incorporate the financial incentives implicit in the de- 
tailed provisions of  firm pension plans and Social Security provisions-pre- 
dict high retirement rates at age 65, these predicted rates typically fall far short 
of the actual age-65 rates. 
In addition, Medicare eligibility begins at age 65. Thus a person not covered 
by  employer-provided retiree health insurance has an incentive to remain in 
the firm until age 65 to avoid a lapse in medical insurance coverage. 
The unexplained age-65 spike is important because it limits our ability to 
predict the effect of potential policy changes, like the planned increase in the 
Social Security normal retirement age from age 65 to age 67. Would there then 
be a spike at 67, or would it remain at 65? 
We  seek to quantify the age-65 retirement puzzle and to explore potential 
explanations  for it. These include in particular the potential gap in health insur- 
ance coverage between retirement and the Medicare eligibility age. We  also 
consider whether family status affects age-65 retirement. And we explore the 
possibility that our previous results were importantly affected by  small sam- 
ples of older workers. Because so many employees retire early, the number still 
employed at 65 is typically small. 
None of these possibilities explains the age-65 spike, lending indirect sup- 63  Why Are Retirement Rates So High at Age 65? 
port to the “age-65 retirement effect” explanation. To support the plausibility 
of an age-65 effect, we also consider the possibility that for some employees 
the utility cost to electing to retire at this “customary” retirement age is small. 
We  conclude that the economic cost is indeed small for some, although for 
most employees it is quite large. For most employees, choosing to retire at age 
65 would impose noticeable economic cost. However, for some it might not be 
very costly to retire at the “customary” age of 65. To the extent that this is true, 
the customary effect might not persist in the face of new financial disincentives 
for age-65 retirement. 
2.1  Age-65 Retirement Rates 
We review additional evidence in the literature on age-65 retirement effects. 
In addition, we document the spike in retirement rates at age 65 in six separate 
data sources, three reflecting the experience of individual firms and three based 
on nationally representative surveys. As emphasized above, however, it is not 
solely the jump in retirement rates at 65 that motivates this paper, but rather 
that the jump is not explained by financial considerations incorporated in for- 
mal models. 
2.1.1  Previous Literature 
Many previous studies have found evidence of an age-65 retirement spike. 
However, few have successfully fit this spike without explicitly incorporating 
age or age dummies as explanatory variables. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) 
were successful in fitting both the age-62 and age-65 retirement spikes in data 
from the Retirement History Survey (RHS). However, they modeled the trade- 
off between labor and leisure as a smoothly increasing function of  age and, 
importantly, did not have detailed firm pension data; thus the Social Security 
normal and early retirement ages were allowed to play important roles in de- 
termining the profile of retirement benefits. 
Also using the RHS, Phelan and Rust (1991) calculated a frequency distri- 
bution of retirement ages. They considered six different definitions of retire- 
ment, including the year that a person first worked less than full-time, the age 
of first receipt of Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and a 
self-reported retirement date. Although the retirement frequency distributions 
differ for the different definitions, all exhibit a spike at age 65. A spike in the 
frequency distribution of retirement at 65, while not the same as a spike in the 
departure rate at that age, implies a spike in the age-65 hazard rate as well. In 
a subsequent study (1993) Phelan and Rust consider retirement rates of indi- 
viduals with and without employer-related health insurance and find that the 
age-65 spike is more pronounced for individuals with health insurance. 
Blau (1994) too uses the RHS in his study of labor force dynamics. Using 
quarterly data, he finds that a substantial fraction of  individuals retire in the 
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Fig. 2.1  Firm 1 hazard rates: office workers 
of the age-65 retirement spike to an individual’s level of Social Security bene- 
fit. Geweke, Zarkin, and Slonim (1993) also document evidence of  a large 
spike in the probability of application for Social Security benefits in the first 
quarter after an individual’s 65th birthday. 
2.1.2  Firm-Specific Data Sets 
The first three data sets are from employment records of three firms, here 
referred to as Firm 1, Firm 2, and Firm 3. For each firm we have data on past 
wages, years of service, and the details of the firm’s pension plan. Depending 
on the firm, we also have information on occupation and some additional indi- 
vidual attributes. Departure rates for selected groups of employees in each of 
these firms are plotted in figures 2.1, 2.2,  and 2.3, respectively. Although the 
details of each firm’s pension plan differ, their overall characteristics are simi- 
lar. The early retirement age is 55 and the normal retirement age 65 in each of 
the firms. The departure rates have generally similar shapes. 
Firm 1 departure rates pertain to office workers and are shown by  gender. 
There were 1,354 men and 2,497 women aged 50 and over in 1981.’ Firm 3 
departure rates pertain to all firm  employees and are also shown by gender, 
with 10,221  men and 2,889 women aged 50 and over in 1982.*  Only 718 obser- 
I. Departure rates for salesmen in Firm 1 were analyzed by Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b). In 
this firm the date of retirement is inferred from the year in which the employee ceased to receive 
a paycheck from the firm. 
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vations of men and women 55 and over in  1979 are available for Firm 2, and 
the departure rates are shown for men and women combined. All three firms 
are large Fortune 500 companies with defined-benefit pension plans.3 
Departure rates in Firms 1 and 3 show spikes at 65.4  For example, at Firm 1 
the retirement rate for 64-year-old men is 28%, while for 65-year-old men it is 
39%. For women at Firm 1, the retirement rates at ages 64 and 65 are respec- 
tively 20% and 41%. The pattern is similar in Firm 3: the age-64 retirement 
rate is 21% for men and 18% for women, and rises to 48% for men and 41% 
for women at age 65.5 The evidence for Firm 2 is less pronounced, although 
there is a noticeable spike at 65 and the general pattern of departure rates in 
Firm 2 is similar to the pattern in Firms 1 and 3. 
2.1.3  Cross-Firm Data Sets 
The  high  age-65  retirement rates  could  be  typical  in  large firms with 
defined-benefit plans but not representative of the broader population of firms 
and workers. Evidence from three additional surveys with data on workers 
from many  different firms, however, reveals a similar pattern in the broader 
population.6  The first survey is the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey 
(NMES), a survey of approximately fourteen thousand households. The NMES 
respondents were asked their date of retirement. The departure rates reported 
here are for respondents who were at least 70 years old and retired. 
The second and third data sets have been constructed from different waves 
(quarterly interviews) of  the Survey of  Income and  Program Participation 
(SIPP): the 1984 wave with the “Education and Work History” supplemental 
questions (SIPP-EWH) and the 1984, 1985, and 1986 waves with the “Charac- 
teristics of Job from Which Retired” supplemental questions (SIPP-CJR).  The 
retirement definition used in the SIPP-CJR is the date at which an individual 
left the firm that was providing pension benefits. In the SIPP-EWH, the retire- 
ment date is the last date worked. Hazard rates, like those based on the NMES 
3. These data have been collected as part of the National Bureau of Economic Research project 
on the economics of  aging. The data for each firm and its pension plan have been discussed in 
detail elsewhere, and we will not repeat the discussion here. For a discussion of the data for Firm 
1 and its pension plan, see Stock and Wise (1990b). The Fm  2 data and its pension plan are 
discussed in Lumsdaine, Mutschler, and Wise (1992). The Firm 3 data and its pension plan are 
discussed in Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1994). 
4.  For Fm  1 there are also noticeable spikes at 62 and 60, corresponding respectively to the 
Social Security early retirement age and to special provisions of the pension plan. 
5. The data for Firms 2 and 3 have exact dates of retirement and birth, while the data for Firm 
1 contain only the year of retirement and birth. This introduces some measurement error into the 
Firm  1 hazard rates, which is not present in the Firms 2 and 3 hazard rates. For Firm 1 the ages 
are computed to be the age of the individual on January 1  ;  thus some retirements that in fact occur 
at age 65 (retirements by  workers who began the year at 64 and retired that year but after their 
65th birthday) are miscounted as age-64 retirements. 
6. We are grateful to Brigitte Madrian for graciously providing us with these data, specifically 
the number of retirees by  age for each of the three data sets, broken down by whether or not they 
have employer-provided retiree health insurance. 67  Why Are Retirement Rates So High at Age  65? 
data, were computed for respondents who were at least 70 years old and re- 
tired. For additional discussion of the data sets and definitions of retirement 
dates, see Madrian (1993). 
Hazard rates for men based on the three national data sets, as well as the 
three firm data sets, are reported in table 2.1. Age-65 (and age-64) retirement 
rates based on the national data are very similar to the rates in the individual 
firms, with the national age-65 rates ranging from 44 to 52%. Thus the age-65 
retirement spike seen in the firm data is common nationwide. 
Although an age-65 spike is revealed in each of the data sets, there are im- 
portant differences at other ages. There are more early retirements in the indi- 
vidual firms than in the national data sets. For example, the age-60 retirement 
rate in Firm 3 is 19% for men, while it is less than 8% in each of  the national 
data sets. This age-60 spike in Firm 3 corresponds to pension plan provisions 
that encourage retirement at age 60. More generally, the defined-benefit pen- 
sion plan provisions in each of the firms provide substantial incentives to leave 
the firm by  age 65, and usually before that. Such incentives are not common 
to all of the respondents in the national data sets. Indeed, only about one-half 
of  workers are covered by  employer-provided pension plans and only about 
two-thirds of these are covered by defined-benefit pension plans, with provis- 
ions that are likely to be similar to those in the three firms. The proportion of 
older workers covered is higher, however. 
Another explanation is that the firm data measure separation from the firm, 
and some of those who leave the firm could remain in the labor force, espe- 
cially those who leave the firm at younger ages. Thus, notwithstanding the 
Table 2.1  Retirement Rates for Men from Six Data Sets 
































































NMES  SIPP-EWH  SIPP-CJR 
0.022  0.026  0.016 
0.018  0.019  0.027 
0.025  0.019  0.019 
0.033  0.029  0.038 
0.048  0.035  0.054 
0.063  0.064  0.075 
0.110  0.107  0.095 
0.174  0.150  0.170 
0.160  0.146  0.188 
0.350  0.274  0.353 
0.441  0.456  0.518 
0.324  0.306  0.391 
0.424  0.378  0.404 
0.569  0.528  0.523 
1,064  979  1,190 
Notes:  Entries are empirical hazard rates. The data sets are discussed in the text. 68  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
firm pension provision incentives for early retirement, early departure from the 
worker’s  primary job can be consistent with later departures from the labor 
force, the concept measured in the NMES and SIPP-CJR data. 
Because a large fraction of workers at the three firms retire before age 65, 
the age-65 retirement rate is based on a relatively small number of workers. In 
earlier work (Stock and Wise 1990b; Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1992, 1994), 
we emphasized that, although the retirement models fit departure rates very 
well in general, they typically underpredict age-65 departure rates. However, 
because early retirement is less common nationally than in the firms we have 
studied, the national data sets contain a rather large sample of persons who 
work until age 65. And a substantial fraction of those who do, retire at 65. For 
example, according to the SIPP-EWH data, of those retiring between ages 55 
and 69, 18% retire at age 65. 
2.2  Descriptive Evidence on Early Retirement 
We consider several hypotheses that have been suggested to explain the large 
age-65 retirement rates. First, we consider the possibility that the age-65 jump 
is driven by health insurance, the availability of Medicare at age 65. Second, 
using data on 65-year-olds from Firm 3, we estimate simple models of retire- 
ment linking the retirement decision to various economic and demographic 
attributes, such as marital status. 
2.2.1 
Medicare coverage is available at age 65. The extent to which it provides an 
incentive to remain employed until 65 depends on the nature of health coverage 
before age 65. For employees not covered by firm health insurance, medical 
insurance does not affect the retirement decision beyond the need for income 
to meet health care costs. Most large firms, however, provide health insurance 
for current employees and typically also provide retiree health insurance. Cov- 
erage usually can be extended to the families of employees and retirees. For 
these workers, Medicare availability provides no additional incentive to post- 
pone retirement until age 65. But many workers are in a third situation: they 
are covered by employer medical insurance while employed but not after retire- 
ment. They may retain the option to continue coverage through the firm group 
health plan but must pay the full cost of the premium. Employees in this group 
will have an incentive to postpone retirement until age 65, when they become 
eligible for Medicare. This is a possible reason for the large age-65 retire- 
ment rate. 
Some evidence investigating this view has been noted recently. In chapter 4 
in this volume, Gruber and Madrian estimate that the effect of continuation 
coverage laws is an increase in retirement rates at all ages, not just at the age 
of Medicare eligibility. In a more structural analysis, Phelan and Rust (1993) 
incorporate risk aversion and find significant differences in the retirement pat- 
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terns of individuals who have health insurance versus those who do not. How- 
ever, Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) estimate that, although most of the effect 
of  health insurance on the retirement decision is via retiree health insurance 
(as opposed to insurance while working), this effect is quantitatively small. 
In addition, we offer two types of indirect evidence that may cast doubt on 
this explanation. The first is based on the data from Firm 3, the firm for which 
we have the most detailed information about postretirement  medical coverage. 
Retirees from the firm continue to be covered under the firm’s group medical 
plan at no additional cost. Even beyond age 65, the plan reimburses costs not 
covered by  Medicare. Thus lapse of  coverage before Medicare eligibility 
would not have been a consideration in retirement from this firm. Nonetheless, 
as discussed in the previous section, for both men and women at Firm 3 the 
departure rates are highest at age 65 and more than double the age-64 depar- 
ture rate. 
The second type of indirect evidence is drawn from the three national data 
sets. Madrian (1993) has performed a careful analysis of  the effect of  firm- 
provided retiree health insurance on retirement, and we draw on her evidence 
here. Table 2.2 provides NMES and SIPP retirement rates for employees with 
and without firm-provided retiree health insurance. The striking feature of the 
data is the qualitative and quantitative similarity of the hazard rates for those 
with and without firm-provided employee health insurance. Indeed, the NMES 
and SIPP-EWH age-65 hazard rates are less for those without than with retiree 
Table 2.2  Retirement Rates for Men: NMES and SIPP Data Sets, with and without 
Firm-Provided  Retiree Health Insurance 
NMES  SIPP-EWH  SPP-CJR 
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Nores: Entries are empirical hazard rates, computed as discussed in the text. The difference between 
hazard rates for employees without and with retiree health insurances is significant at the following level: 
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health insurance, although the differences are not statistically significant. For 
the SIPP-CJR, the age-65 hazard is higher for those without than with insur- 
ance, but the difference is not statistically significant. The age-65 national data 
hazard rates are also comparable to the rate in Firm 3, which provides postre- 
tirement health insurance. At other ages the differences between the national 
data hazard rates for persons with and without retiree health insurance are 
typically statistically insignificant. These comparisons suggest that Medicare 
eligibility is not an important determinant of age-65 retirement. More formal 
models of the retirement decision based on these national data sets have been 
estimated by Madrian (1993). 
2.2.2  Other Determinants of Retirement at Age 65 
We  consider next age-65 retirement among Firm 3 employees, for whom 
Medicare eligibility is not plausibly an important consideration. Because we 
have  historical payroll and demographic data for a large number of Firm 3 
employees, along with complete details of retirement benefits offered by  the 
firm, the Firm 3 data provide an opportunity to examine non-Medicare eco- 
nomic and noneconomic determinants of  age-65 retirement. The analysis in 
this section is based on a sample of 203 employees who turned 65 in 1981 and 
were employed at Firm 3 on their 65th birthday. Of these 203 employees, 40 
were women and 163 were men. The combined age-65 retirement rate for these 
employees was 58.1%. 
The departure rates at age 65 for several subgroups of these employees are 
summarized in table 2.3. Only a few of  the differences are statistically and 
substantively significant. Age-65 married men are significantly more likely to 
retire than single men. Employees with less than 10 years of service at the firm 
are less likely to retire, although there are only small differences between the 
retirement rates for those with 10-19,20-29,  and 30+ years of service. Those 
with low earnings, and therefore typically with lower pension benefits and 
lower lifetime wealth, are somewhat less likely to retire at 65 than those with 
a high income, although this difference is not  significant at the 5%  level. 
Age-65 retirement rates do not vary with the job classification. 
To determine whether these factors are related to age-65 retirement, after 
controlling for economic variables, we estimated a series of probit retirement 
specifications using this sample of 65-year-olds. In addition to the variables 
identifying the table 2.3 subgroups, the specifications include several eco- 
nomic variables: predicted annual age-65 income, the expected present value 
of Social Security payments, the expected present value of pension payments, 
the change in expected Social Security wealth resulting from working an addi- 
tional year (that is, retiring at age 66 rather than age 65-Social  Security ac- 
crual), and the change in expected pension wealth resulting from postponing 
retirement until age 66 (pension accrual). 
An additional economic variable is the “option value” of  remaining em- 
ployed an additional year,  calculated using the Stock-Wise (1990b) option 71  Why Are Retirement Rates So High at Age  65? 
Table 2.3  Age-65 Retirement Rates for Different Categories of Worker 
(data  set: 65-year-olds at Firm 3) 
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Men  163  ,607 
(.308) 
Single  61  ,443 
(.064) 
Single men  31  ,387 
(.087) 
Single women  30  .500 
(.091) 












Notes:  Entries are the fraction of 65-year-olds in the indicated group who retire at age 65. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Differences are significantly different from zero at the following level: 
* = 10%; ** = 1%. 
’Entries in the “difference” column are the difference between retirement rates for the group in 
the first and second category columns in that row. 
value model. It is computed as the difference between the lifetime expected 
present value of income and retirement benefits were the individual to retire at 
the optimal age (which could be later than 65), and the present value of income 
and retirement benefits under age-65 retirement. For this calculation the opti- 
mal age of  retirement is taken to be the age that maximizes the current ex- 
pected value of  lifetime earnings. Thus this option value is a measure of the 
monetary opportunity cost of  retiring at age 65 rather than later. Of  course, 
for some employees the opportunity cost is zero, that is, age-65 retirement 
maximizes lifetime wealth. 
All of  the present values-the  option value, Social Security accrual, and 
pension accrual-were  computed using forecasts of  future earnings based on 
the past employee earnings and the firm’s historical age-income profile.’ F’res- 
7. The earnings forecasting equation for employees at Firm 3 is discussed in detail in Lums- 
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ent values assume a discount factor of 0.90 and incorporate mortality rates 
calculated from life tables. 
Parameter estimates are presented in table 2.4. In each specification,  married 
male employees have a significantly higher tendency than single men to retire 
at age 65. Consistent with the results in table 2.3, married women are slightly 
less likely than single women to retire at 65, although the difference is not 
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Notes:  The sample consists of 203 workers in Fm 3 who were employed by  the firm when they turned 
65 and who retired either at age 65 or after; the dependent variable is one if retirement is at age 65 and 
zero otherwise. All monetary values are in $1OO,OOO  (1980 dollars). Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significant at the following level: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 73  Why Are Retirement Rates So High at Age 65? 
statistically significant. Gender, job category, and even job tenure are only 
weakly related to this retirement decision, both unconditionally and after con- 
trolling for the economic variables. Conditional on not retiring before age 65, 
although the overall age-65 retirement rate is very high, none of the economic 
variables is a statistically significant determinant of age-65 retirement. In con- 
trast, these variables predict retirement at other ages. Indeed, calculations that 
underlie these variables play the central role in the structural option value and 
stochastic dynamic programming retirement models that predict very success- 
fully retirement over all ages. This analysis provides no economic or demo- 
graphic explanations for age-65 retirement decisions. The only conclusion is 
that married men are more likely than unmarried men to retire at 65, given that 
they have worked until then. 
2.3  Evidence from a Structural Retirement Model 
As explained above, the motivation for this series of analysis is the general 
failure of structural models of retirement to account for the high age-65 retire- 
ment rate, without including age-specific dummy variables or other model 
specifications  that assure a close match to retirement rates at specific ages. We 
document this failure and explore alternative specifications that might, in  a 
mechanical sense, permit the models to fit the age-65 retirement rate. We first 
estimate a “base” stochastic  dynamic programming model of retirement, which 
we take as representative of the new generation of retirement models. We then 
modify this model to incorporate noneconomic reasons for retiring at age 65. 
2.3.1 
The stochastic dynamic programming model used here is described in detail 
in Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992). It incorporates aspects of the models 
of  Berkovec and Stem (1991) and Daula and Moffitt (1991). The model is 
summarized briefly here. It is a simplified version of  a fuller stochastic dy- 
namic programming model in which retirement is treated as an absorbing state 
and annual consumption is set equal to annual income. Rust (1989) discusses 
the computational complexity in a more general approach. 
In this model, if the worker is employed and earns income Y,  in year t, then 
the systematic component of utility in that year is 
The Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model 
A retired person receives monetary retirement benefits B,  and the systematic 
component of  utility in year t is 
where the retirement benefits B,(r)  depend on the year r in which the worker 
retired. The factor k represents a multiplicative increase of  utility obtained 74  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
from receiving payments B, without having at the same time to work. 
The stochastic dynamic programming model predicts retirement by compar- 
ing the expected value of retiring today to the expected value of working an- 
other year and thereby retaining the option to retire later. The decision is based 
on the recursive representation of the value function, W,, 
where p is the discount factor and S is the maximum length of life (taken to 
be age 95). Discounting incorporates mortality rates. 
and s2,  in (3) represent random shocks to utilities associated 
with income when working and when retired, respectively. The specification 
estimated here assumes that the errors, E,, and E~,,  are independent normally 
distributed. Derails of  the estimation method are presented in Lumsdaine, 
Stock, and Wise (1992). 
2.3.2  Data and Results 
Our previous retirement model estimates, based on firm data, have used 
samples in which older employees were underrepresented relative to those in 
their 50s and early 60s. This is a consequence of  high departure rates  at 
younger ages, leaving few employees still employed at age 65; a random 
sample includes few older employees. Thus a possible explanation of the mis- 
match between actual and predicted age-65 retirement rates is the dispropor- 
tionate weight given to the younger of  the older employees. To  address this 
possibility, the sample used here includes approximately equal numbers of em- 
ployees at all ages, with a total of  1,007 women and 1,727 men between age 
50 and 69. The balanced sample is made possible by the large number of em- 
ployees in Firm 3. 
The estimated parameters for the stochastic dynamic programming model 
are presented in table 2.5 for women and in table 2.6 for men. The discount 
factor P was set to 0.9 in models 1-3;  it was estimated in model 4. The parame- 
ter values for the base model 1 in each table indicate little curvature in the 
utility function; the hypothesis that y = 1 cannot be rejected at the 10% level 
for either the men or the women. The parameter k is approximately three for 
both men and women. Interpreted literally, these results imply that utility is 
approximately linear in income, with $1 received while retired worth approxi- 
mately $3 of income while working. 
Actual and predicted departure rates for this sample are compared in figure 
2.4 for women and in figure 2.5 for men. The top panel in these figures shows 
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Table 2.5  Parameter Estimates for Dynamic Programming Model 
(data set: Firm 3, women, N = 1,007) 
Model 









































-In  likelihood 
Likelihood-ratio  test versus 
model 1 
303.59  299.43  299.07  297.08 
8.32**  9.04*  13.02** 
Notes:  Estimation is by maximum likelihood.  All monetary values are in $100,000 (1980 dollars). 
Significant  at the following level: * = 5%; ** = 1%. 
"Parameter values imposed. 
Table 2.6  Parameter Estimates for Dynamic Programming Model 
(data set: Firm 3, men, N = 1,727) 
Model 
Parameter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 







(0.17  1) 
-0.574 
(0.700) 


















0.9"  0.9  0.9" 
0.158 
(0.0  15) 
0.158 
(0.014) 
0.15P  U 
Summary statistics 
-In  likelihood 
Likelihood-ratio  test versus 
model 1 
587.75  587.83  588.53  587.84 
1.56  1.38  1.40 
Notes:  Estimation is by maximum likelihood.  All monetary values are in $100,OOO (1980 dollars). 
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Fig. 2.4  Departure rates: women 
annual departure rates, the lower panel cumulative departure. The base model 
1 fits the general trends in the hazard rates reasonably well. However, at age 
65 in particular, but also at age 62, the models underestimate the high retire- 
ment rates. For example, the hazard rate at age 65 predicted by the base model 
is 27%  for women and 34%  for men; the actual hazard rates are 44% for 
women and 6 1  % for men. 
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prior analyses based on this and other firm data. The predicted departure rates 
are often 40 to 60% of  the actual rates. For example, Lumsdaine, Stock, and 
Wise (1992) considered two variants of  the stochastic dynamic programming 
model estimated in this paper (one with normal errors, as here, and one with 
logistic errors) and the Stock-Wise (1990b) “option value” model. All the mod- 
els underpredicted age-65 retirement rates by  amounts comparable to those 
found here. Thus the use of a random sample with relatively few older employ- 78  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
ees is not the explanation for the mismatch between  actual and predicted 
age-65 departure rates. 
To investigate age-65 retirement in more detail, we examined an additional 
parameterization that allows employees to behave as though they receive addi- 
tional utility-in  addition to financial inducements at that age-from  retire- 
ment at 65. Because the analysis of section 2.2 suggests that age-65 retirement 
varies with marital status, we included a dummy variable for marital status as 
well. We parameterize k in equation 2 as a function of age and marital status, 
(4) 
where D6, and Dmmed  are one if the individual is 65 and married, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. 
Results using the parameterization (4) for women are given in models 2-4 
of table 2.5. The coefficient on the age-65 dummy is individually statistically 
significant, and the coefficients on the two dummies when estimated together 
are jointly significant. When the marital status dummy is included, its esti- 
mated  coefficient is approximately equal to the coefficient on  the  age-65 
dummy, and opposite in sign, so the predicted probability of retirement at age 
65 is higher only for single women. This accords with the evidence from table 
2.3, showing that single women aged 65 have somewhat higher retirement rates 
than married women. 
The predicted model 2 and 3 departure rates for women are also plotted in 
figure 2.4. At younger ages, the age-65 utility “bonus” has little effect on the 
predicted rates. However, the bonus results in somewhat lower retirement rates 
just before age 65 (from 60 to 64) and higher rates at 65. Still, this parameter- 
ization (4) “explains” only half of the age-65 mismatch. 
The results for men are given in the final three columns of table 2.6, add the 
hazard rates based on model 2 are plotted in figure 2.5. Unlike the results for 
women, none of the coefficients on the dummy variables are significant, even 
though the retirement rates reported in table 2.3 are significantly higher for 
married than for single age-65 men. We interpret this to mean that differential 
rates for age-65 men result from different earnings histories-and  thus pen- 
sion and Social Security wealth. The departure rates based on model 2 for men 
are very similar to those of the base model, consistent with the small numerical 
value of the coefficient on the age-65 dummy variable. 
In  summary, for neither men nor women does the base model explain the 
age-65 retirement spike. For single women the equation (4) parameterization 
appears to explain some of the difference between actual and predicted age- 
65 departure rates. For men this parameterization explains essentially none of 
the mismatch. 
2.3.3 
The optimization model of the previous section is a mathematically tractable 
framework for approximating retirement decisions. Indeed, the model typi- 
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cally predicts retirement rates rather accurately. Age 65 is the exception. One 
explanation for the “unexplained” retirement at 65 is that the cost of choosing 
that age, relative to 64 or 66 for example, is small, so that there is no overriding 
reason to deviate from the age that some may consider “normal.” In particular 
this may be true for employees who choose not to retire substantially before 
age 65. In this sense age 65 could serve as a customary focal date for retire- 
ment, which might be sustained if the opportunity cost of retiring at that focal 
age is small. 
We  explore in this section the cost of choosing to retire at 65. That is, we 
evaluate the opportunity cost of adopting a “retire-at-65’’ rule of thumb. From 
an economic perspective, whether such a rule of thumb is plausible depends on 
the opportunity cost of following the rule. To illustrate the possible magnitudes 
involved, we measure this opportunity cost by the lifetime utility forgone by 
choosing to retire at 65 rather than at some other age. For a given individual 
the expected lifetime utility of retiring at age r is 
V,(r)  = ZW-~~~(YJ  + ~,WU~(B~(~)).  (5) 
The individual does not live beyond age S. In particular the lifetime utility 
obtained by adopting the age-65 rule of thumb is Vt(t65).  We compute the maxi- 
mum lifetime utility as it is computed in the Stock-Wise (1990b) option value 
model, V,(r*),  where r* is the value of r (r = t, . . . ,  t,.,) that maximizes V,(r). 
The measure of  opportunity cost tabulated here is the fraction of  lifetime 
utility forgone,&,  by adopting the age-65 rule of thumb relative to choosing to 
retire at r*, that is, 
S=f  I=#- 
Because y  is insignificantly different from 1, for the computation of the distri- 
bution of  equation (6) we  set y = 1. This would make the units of lifetime 
utility current dollars, except that dollars received while retired are weighted 
by the leisure parameter k. The estimates of the leisure parameters from model 
1 in tables 2.5 and 2.6 for women and men, respectively, are used in the calcu- 
lations. 
Selected percentiles of the estimated distributions of lifetime utility forgone 
as a result of the age-65 rule of thumb for employees between the ages of 55 
and 64  are shown in table 2.7 for employees in our balanced sample. For some 
employees the retirement date that maximizes the expected value of  lifetime 
utility is 65, so for them& = 0. These are the employees with the highest 
predicted age-65 retirement rates. If expected lifetime utility is maximized by 
retiring at other than age 65, then& is positive. The table shows that for at least 
half the employees the cost of electing to retire at 65 rather than the optimal 
age is substantial, exceeding 20%. For example, the typical 60-year-old man 
would gain 23% by  electing to retire at the optimal age rather than age 65; 80  Robin L. Lumsdaine, James H. Stock, and David A. Wise 
Table 2.7  Distribution of Fractional Utility Losses  from Adopting an Age-65 
Rule of Thumb 
Percentile 






















,007  ,043 
,007  .05 1 
,009  .055 
,009  ,060 
.012  .074 
.013  .08 1 
,019  ,108 
,016  ,098 
,009  ,086 
,009  .063 
B. Women 
,018  ,074 
,011  .074 
.007  .073 
.017  ,096 
.014  ,110 
.022  ,131 
,016  ,118 
,016  ,131 
,025  ,150 





















Notes: Entries are the percentiles of the distribution of  [V,(r*) -  V,(f6J]/V,(t6J  by age, as defined 
in the text. For women, the lifetime utilities were computed using y = 1, k = 2.974, and p = 0.9; 
for men, y = 1, k = 3.591, and p = 0.9. 
the typical woman would gain 30%. Nonetheless, the gain for a minority of 
employees is small, 1 or 2% at the tenth percentile. Thus these calculations are 
inconsistent with the possibility that the typical employee would lose little by 
electing to retire at 65. 
The reasoning of Akerlof and Yellen (1985) seems not to help in this in- 
stance. They point out that apparently large deviations from optimality when 
measured in terms of decision variables are consistent with nearly rational be- 
havior, when the individual’s objective function is rather flat in a region around 
the optimum. For most employees the opportunity cost of following an age-65 
rule of thumb is large, and for them it would be expensive to retire at a custom- 
ary but suboptimal date. However, for a minority of employees it seems not to 
be costly to shift retirement from an optimal date to age 65. These shifts by a 
relatively small fraction of  workers to the customary retirement age could in 
principle be sufficient to explain the age-65 spike, because the absolute num- 
ber of retirees at age 65 is small even though the retirement rate is large. An 
implication of this explanation, and in particular of the large opportunity costs 81  Why  Are Retirement Rates So High at Age 65? 
for most workers, is that shifts in Social Security or pension plan provisions 
that made age-65 retirement less advantageous could overcome an age-65 cus- 
tomary retirement effect. 
These computations are based only on future labor income and pension and 
Social Security benefits; they omit other sources of  wealth like home equity 
and personal financial assets. Postretirement utilities should be augmented in 
accordance with the amount of personal wealth that the worker does not plan 
to bequeath. For example, the specification in equation (2) could in principle 
include the annuity value of personal financial assets. We do not have individ- 
ual asset data for Firm 3 employees. However, incorporating other wealth into 
V,  would tend to decrease the proportional lifetime utility losses in table 2.7. 
2.4  Conclusions 
The high age-65 retirement rate for the small proportion of employees who 
work until that age is not explained by Medicare eligibility, based on compari- 
son of the retirement rates of employees with and without employee-provided 
retiree health insurance. This conclusion is supported by the high age-65 retire- 
ment rates of Firm 3 employees, who have generous retiree health insurance. 
Still the age-65 retirement rate for Firm 3 employees is twice as high as the 
age-64 rate. Nor is the high age-65 rate explained by demographic attributes 
of employees. Nor is it explained by the use of data sets with small proportions 
of persons who are still employed at age 65. 
Disproportionate age-65 retirement might be explained by  an age-65 rule of 
thumb, which could be rationalized economically if the cost of such a rule were 
small. But our calculations suggest that the opportunity cost would typically be 
very large, even for employees who worked until 64. 
Thus we are left with the hypothesis with which we started. We are inclined 
to attribute the unexplained high age-65 departure rates to an “age-65 retire- 
ment effect,” that is, to the influence of custom or accepted practice. 
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